Abstract-PHY layer authentication of a wireless sender has gained much interest recently. In this paper, we consider the famous Alice, Bob and Eve model and investigate (for the first time) the feasibility of using time-varying clock offsets for sendernode-authentication at Bob. Specifically, we exploit the fact (and de-facto problem) that clock offset between every node pair is unique; moreover, the two clock offsets between any two node pairs drift independently and randomly over time. Therefore, an explicit mechanism is needed to track the time-varying clock offsets. To this end, we model oscillator drift as brownian motion frequency and phase drift, and present a novel framework which is based on interplay between a hypothesis testing device and a bank of two Kalman filters; one KF (KF H 0 ) tracks Alice's clock while other KF (KF H 1 ) tracks Eve's clock. Building on aforementioned framework, we then propose a novel sendernode-authentication method (so-called MHF method) by means of which Bob can automatically accept (reject) a received packet if it is sent by Alice (Eve). Finally, simulation results are presented which corroborate the efficiency of the proposed method.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless systems, due to broadcast nature of wireless medium, are prone to attacks by intruders and eavesdroppers. Hence, there is always the need for robust security techniques so as to ensure secure communication between two legitimate parties. Ever since their advent and subsequent widespread, wireless networks have remained largely accustomed to using higher layer cryptographic protocols for authentication/security purposes. However, since the last decade, there has been growing interest in investigating physical (PHY) layer security techniques so as to complement/improve the existing higher layer security mechanisms. See, e.g., [1] , [2] for a quick overview of recent development in the field.
Related work. A large body of work on PHY layer security is primarily concerned with various information theoretic models (of potential attacks) and corresponding performance limits (following the pioneer work by [3] , [4] ). Specifically, two main ingredients of PHY layer security are sender-node-authentication and shared secret key generation. With the recent surge of interest in exploiting PHY layer (medium/hardware) characteristics to implement security, the problem of shared secret key generation has been intensively investigated by researchers. Yet the problem of sender-nodeauthentication has received little attention so far.
In [5] , authors exploit the spatio-temporal-filter property of channel frequency response (CFR) of the frequency-selective but time-invarient channel shared between legitimate node pair to authenticate the received packets at the designated receiver node. Same authors later extend this idea to time-varying channels; due to changes in scattering environment in [6] , and due to node mobility in [7] . Authors in [8] investigate this concept further in MIMO/OFDM settings. On the other hand, [9] exploits properties of channel impulse response (CIR) of frequency-selective but time-invarient channels between node pairs to do the authentication. Liu et. al. then extend this idea to time-varying channels in [10] , [11] . Finally, [12] takes a different approach where so-called tags are used for authentication purposes (a tag is a function of shared secret key and to-be transmitted message which is then superimposed on the message). [13] , [14] extend this idea to MIMO systems.
Other than radio channel, clock offsets which arise due to manufacturing tolerances and environmental conditions of underlying oscillators can also serve as source of common randomness; and therefore, are the subject of this work. To the best of authors' knowledge, to date, there has been no work on this interesting topic except [15] . There, the authors utilize frequency offsets for sender-node-authentication via hypothesis testing under the idealistic assumption that frequency offsets between node pairs remain constant all the time which is not the case in practice.
Contributions. We consider the famous Alice, Bob and Eve model [5] and investigate the feasibility of using timevarying clock offsets for sender-node-authentication at Bob. Specifically, we exploit the fact (and de-facto problem) that clock offset between every node pair is unique; moreover, clock offsets between any two node pairs drift independently and randomly over time. To this end, we present a novel framework which is based on interplay between a hypothesis testing device and a bank of two Kalman filters; one KF (KF H0 ) tracks Alice's clock while the other KF (KF H1 ) tracks Eve's clock. Building on aforementioned framework, we then propose a novel node-authentication method, the so-called measurement-hypothesis-filtering (MHF) method, by means of which Bob can automatically accept (reject) a received packet if it is sent by Alice (Eve). By means of simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed MHF method provides superior performance in terms of probability of missed detection (i.e., success probability of Eve, P md ). Specifically, we obtain P md ≤ 3 × 10 −4 for full practical range-of-interest of prespecified false alarm rate values (Bob discarding Alice's packet) P f a , i.e., 10 −6 ≤ P f a ≤ 10 −1 , which is (at least) an order of magnitude better than the previous techniques reported in the literature [5] - [11] , [15] . At the same time, this work is a contribution to Kalman filter as detector (KFaD) problem. Kalman filters have been exten-sively used for multi-object detection and tracking in the fields of oceanic engineering and image processing. Specifically, researchers in the two fields have considered the KFaD problem under different acronyms such as multiple target tracking (MTT) [16] , joint probabilistic data association (JPDA) [17] , multi-hypothesis tracking (MHT) algorithms [18] , probabilistic multi-hypothesis tracking (PMHT) algorithms [19] , and interacting multiple model (IMM). Nevertheless, each of the aforementioned methods assumes that at every given time instant, measurements from multiple targets are available. However, this is not the case in the scenario under consideration in this work where simultaneous transmission by both Alice and Eve results in collision at Bob. Therefore, methods presented in [16] - [19] are not directly applicable to our situation. Another interesting work which we have become aware of very recently is [20] where authors use normalized innovation sequence of Kalman filter to detect faults in power systems.
Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces system model. Section III describes the novel PHY layer authentication framework and the proposed nodeauthentication method (the MHF method). Section IV provides some simulation results which corroborate the efficiency of the MHF method proposed in section III. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a one-way authentication system as shown in Fig. 1 . Specifically, Alice and Bob are the two legitimate nodes while Eve is an intruder which sends malicious packets to Bob from time to time while trying to impersonate Alice. Therefore, Bob needs a systematic framework to authenticate the sender of every packet it receives. This way, Bob can reject packets from illegal sender Eve. In this paper, we develop one such framework at the PHY layer which provides the springboard for proposed (so-called MHF) method which Bob can utilize for sender-node authentication.
We assume that the one-way authentication channel in Fig.  1 is time-slotted. That is, packets arrive at Bob at discrete-time instants t m where t m − t m−1 = T is the time-gap between two successively received packets at Bob. Moreover, each received packet is T p < T seconds long.
Let f A , f B and f E represent the center frequencies of Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. Ideally, f A = f B = f E = f c (where f c is the center frequency of common communication channel) but it is never the case due to oscillator manufacturing tolerances. As a quick example, the oscillators used in USRP N200 software-defined radios have an accuracy of ±2.5 ppm [21] . Then, for f c = 2.4 GHz, this implies each of f A , f B and f E is uniformly distributed in the range [2.4G − 6K, 2.4G + 6K] Hz initially. Moreover, each of the f A , f B and f E drift randomly over time due to oscillator instability due to environmental conditions and aging. Let ∆f AB (m) = f A (m) − f B (m) represent the frequency offset between Alice and Bob at time t m . Similarly, define ∆f EB (m) = f E (m) − f B (m) as the frequency offset between Eve and Bob at time t m . More precisely, at time t m , Bob either observes a random source x AB (m) due to Alice's transmission; or, Bob observes a random source x EB (m) due to Eve's attack (see Fig. 1 ). Each of the two random sources represents clock (phase and frequency) offset between corresponding node pair; moreover, the two random sources are correlated.
III. PROPOSED PHY LAYER AUTHENTICATION

FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose a novel PHY layer framework which exploits the random time-varying nature of clock offsets x AB (m) and x EB (m) for sender-node authentication. The proposed framework, employed by Bob, consists of a hypothesis testing device followed by a bank of two linear Kalman filters KF H0 and KF H1 which track Alice and Eve's clock respectively. Since every iteration in the proposed method consists of arrival of a new measurement (i.e., packet) followed by hypothesis testing followed by Kalman filtering, we dub the proposed node-authentication method as measurementhypothesis-filtering (MHF) method in the sequel.
A. Kalman Filter Tracking of Drifting Clock Offsets
Process model for KF H0 . In precision oscillators, frequency and phase offsets drift is commonly modeled as random walk phase noise and random walk frequency noise. Using the famous two-state clock model [22] , [23] , we can write the time-evolution of the random source x AB (m) in state-space as:
where
T is the phase and frequency offset of Bob's oscillator with respect to Alice's oscillator at time t m . The state transition matrix F is defined by:
where T is the time between two successively received packets by Bob. n AB (m) is the process noise vector with n AB (m)
is the sampling period used by Bob. Basically, n AB (m) is the phase and frequency noise that causes the phase and frequency offsets to deviate from their nominal values and drift randomly with time. We adapt the following model for process noise covariance matrix [24] : 
. n EB (m) represents the phase and frequency noise between Eve and Bob's clocks; Q(T s ) is the same as in Equation (2).
B. Hypothesis Testing
We formulate the hypothesis testing problem on top of the shared measurement model employed by Bob which is as follows:
where H is the measurement matrix. We assume that access to unwrapped phase (φ AB (m) or φ EB (m)) is available; therefore, we set H = I 2 in this work. z(m) is the (noisy) clock offset estimate vector obtained via running the algorithms in [25] , [26] on received packet (at time t m ) which in our case is a sinusoidal burst of duration (1)- (4) and KF H0 and KF H1 , Bob is able to track the two random sources (i.e., clock offsets x AB (m) and x EB (m)) simultaneously and independently.
C. Proposed MHF Method
The method consists of two distinct phases, Phase-I and Phase-II. Since the purpose of hypothesis testing is to check whether or not the new measurement z(m) is consistent with the believed truth x AB (m), one needs an estimatex AB (m) of the truth. Under linear Gaussian assumptions, KF H0 provides the best estimate/prediction of the truth which isx AB (m) = x AB (m m − 1). Therefore, during Phase-I, KF H0 is trained by Alice's transmissions on a secure channel. Usually, it only takes few iterations until KF H0 converges. Once KF H0 is converged, proposed MHF method enters Phase-II where Bob can authenticate all the received packets on its own. Below, both Phase-I and Phase-II are described in more detail.
Phase-I. KF H0 is trained by Alice and Bob on a secure channel.
Phase-II. Packets are received by Bob at times t m ; since each packet can be from Alice or Eve, measurement-to-filter association is important. Therefore, the hypothesis testing device does two things in one-shot; first and foremost, it provides device authentication; secondly, it assigns each measurement to appropriate KF, i.e., KF H0 or KF H1 . On the other hand, KF H0 (KF H1 ) tracks the time-varying clock offset x AB (m) (x EB (m)), and thus, provides inputs (p-step-ahead prediction of its respective clock offset, p ≥ 1) to the hypothesis testing device. Specifically, upon reception of a packet, Bob first obtains the noisy clock offset estimate
At the same time, KF H0 provides the p-step-ahead predication vector
The hypothesis testing device then applies the following test:
In Equation (5) 
Since H = I 2 , Equation (6) is simplified as: S AB (m) = P AB (m m − p) + R. Similarly, we can simplify Equation (5) as:
Since
is the (2,2) element of S AB (m), the covariance matrix of y(m). Then, the probability of false alarm P f a (i.e., incorrectly identifying Alice's packet as if it is from Eve) is given as:
where Q(.) is the standard Q-function:
By setting P f a to our desired value, δ(m) can be calculated using Equation (8) which is given as follows:
The complete MHF-based node-authentication procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
D. Performance of Proposed MHF Method
The probability of missed detection P md (success probability of Eve) can be calculated as follows:
Then, y ω (m) ∼ N (µ yω H1 (m), S AB,22 (m)) under H 1 where
Assuming that unknown frequency offset is uniformly distributed within its ppm range ω EB (m) ∼ U(−∆, ∆), we have the following:
The closed-form solution of Equation (11) cannot be obtained because it involves the integration of Q function as well as ω AB (m m − p) which can only be obtained from KF H0 at run-time. In case, KF H1 is converged as well (due to Eve being a weak intruder, and hence, unable to decipher the authentication scheme being used by Bob), we have the following expression for P md in steady-state:
At this point, it is worth highlighting the role of KF H1 in the proposed PHY layer authentication framework. Once (and if) converged, it provides two valuable pieces of information. 1) We can calculate the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(r s) between the two prior densities r = p(
provides us information about reliability of hypothesis testing mechanism; f (P AB (m m−p)) is some suitabally chosen function of P AB (m m−p) which is the covariance of estimate/prediction x AB (m m − p) provided by KF H0 . As an example, under the extreme case when D(r s) − f (P AB (m m − p)) is so small that it results in 45 ○ straight line on receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot, hypothesis testing can't be relied upon. 2) By means of ω EB (m m − q), a new expression for P md is obtained in (12) which is more precise than the expression in (11). 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that for Bob, having received a packet, the probabilities that the packet came from Alice or Eve are equal (i.e., P (H 0 ) = P (H 1 ) = 0.5). Furthermore, we assume that there are no collisions in the shared time-slotted channel.
For simulation purposes, we have used f c = 2.4 GHz, T = 50 ms, T p = 5 ms, F s = 1 T s = 20 KSps. The specific values of T p and T were guided by the CRLB-based rule of thumb in [24] so as to make sure that the two KF's (KF H0 and KF H1 ) remain converged throughout the authentication operation. Moreover, assuming that the (noisy) frequency and phase estimates meet CRLB, we have the following covariance matrix for measurement noise [25] , [26] :
where γ represents the SNR at Bob. (5) against time (received packet number) at Bob. Essentially, Fig. 2 demonstrates the real-time working of hypothesis testing device employed by Bob. We can easily and visually identify the packets sent by Eve which result in spikes (much larger than decision threshold δ(m)) in the ω-norm of y(m). For this plot, frequency offset ω AB (m) was initialized to 2π×1000 Hz while frequency offset ω EB (m) was initialized to 2π × 1050 Hz; moreover, a target P f a = 0.1 was used to derive the threshold δ(m) and γ was set to 20 dB. 3 is a plot between probability of false alarm P f a vs. γ for two different P f a values, i.e., P f a {0.1, 0.01}. Since we keep T 2 p γ =constant, the detector proposed in Section III is a constant false alarm rate (CFAR) detector; therefore, we expect to see P f a to be invariant to γ. This is indeed the case for P f a = 0.1 as can be seen in Fig. 3 . However, for P f a = 0.01, the numerically obtained values P f a,n oscillate more about the target P f a,t that is set during calculation of the decision threshold δ(m). We believe this discrepency is due to less amount of averaging in Monte Carlo simulations. Let us define ∆f 0 = f AB (0) − f EB (0) . Then, Fig. 4 shows a plot between P f a,n and ∆f 0 for three different values of γ at Bob. From Fig. 4 , we learn that the lower bound ∆f 0,lb on ∆f 0 for which target P f a,t is respectably met is around 150 Hz. Actually, this lower bound ∆f 0,lb is inversely proportional to P (H 0 ) which means better resolution (a.k.a detection performance) can be achieved in situations when Eve attacks Bob less frequently than Alice talks to Bob (and vice versa). Fig . 5 shows a plot between P md,n and ∆f 0 for three different values of γ at Bob. From Fig. 5 , we learn that the lower bound ∆f 0,lb on ∆f 0 for which target P md,t is respectably met is again around 150 Hz. Specifically, for P f a,t = 0.1, corresponding P md,t is 10 −4 (which is not visible in Fig. 5 though) . Fig. 6 shows an ROC plot between P d (probability of detection) and P f a for three different values of γ at Bob. Note that P d = 1 − P md . Fig. 6 clearly demonstrates that P md ≤ 3 × 10 −4 over the full practical range-of-interest of pre-specified P f a values, i.e., 10 −6 ≤ P f a ≤ 10 −1 ; which is (at least) an order of magnitude better than the previous techniques reported in the literature [5] - [11] , [15] . Moreover, the proposed MHF method requires only one-time training in the beginning to obtain the ground truth, while other channelbased authentication schemes in [5] - [11] require training once every channel coherence interval which might be too much overhead in case of time-varying channels. Finally, frequency offset estimation is already a mandatory operation in modern receivers while channel impulse response estimation and channel frequency response estimation are not. Therefore, schemes in [5] - [11] need additional (hardware/radio spectrum) resources for their implementation which will substantially increase the complexity and cost of the underlying system. 
A. Comparison with Other Authentication Schemes
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the feasibility of using timevarying clock offsets for sender-node-authentication at Bob. Specifically, we exploited the fact that clock offset between every node pair is unique; moreover, clock offsets between any two node pairs drift independently and randomly over time.
To this end, we presented a novel PHY layer authentication framework which is based on interplay between a hypothesis testing device and a bank of two Kalman filters; one KF (KF H0 ) tracks Alice's clock while other KF (KF H1 ) tracks Eve's clock. Building on aforementioned framework, we then provided a novel sender-node-authentication method (so-called MHF method) by means of which Bob can automatically accept (reject) a received packet if it is sent by Alice (Eve). An immediate follow-up work will be to analyze the networklayer performance (i.e., stochastic delay bounds etc.) for the one-way authentication channel introduced in Fig. 1 .
